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Abstract We contrast the theory underpinning state aid for failing bankswith that for failing firms
in the non-financial sector. We argue that there is little justification for measures to ‘compensate’
rivals when the bank has been saved for reasons of systemic stability. The Commission’s approach
to bank restructuring aid takes insufficient notice of this. Furthermore, the use of punitive divest-
itures is not the best way of addressing moral hazard. Worse, such divestitures can impede
competition by creating weak rivals. We provide four detailed case studies to illustrate the
problems. We conclude that the Commission provided a useful constraint in the midst of a crisis
of unprecedented scale and complexity, but its approach could have been improved by more
systematic attention to effective competition relative to the appropriate counterfactual.
Keywords state aid . competition . banks . European Commission
JEL classification F15 (integration) . G21 (banks) . L49 (antitrust policy—other)
1 Introduction
Forty European banks required specific and urgent rescue during the global financial crisis
of 2007–10 and most others received huge amounts of assistance through general schemes.1
Thirty-nine percent of EU GDP was committed to supporting banks from October 2008 to
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1 Fortis Bank, Fortis Bank Luxembourg and Fortis Bank Netherlands are counted as a single bank, as are
Kaupthing Bank Finland and Kaupthing Bank Luxembourg. A further 18 banks notified specific aid during
2011, including an additional five Spanish cajas and the first two Greek banks. However, this trend must be
treated with caution as the Commission effectively treated all banks that require additional state aid after the
second half of 2010 as fundamentally distressed banks, instead of discriminating between distressed and
fundamentally sound banks as it had done at the beginning of the crisis. This article does not include the Euro
sovereign debt crisis which was adversely affecting an increasing number of banks at the time of writing in
May 2012. It is likely that more European banks will need rescuing if there is further sovereign default.
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October 2010. 2 This provided a very sharp reversal of a trend that had seen the total state aid
bill fall from 1 % in 1992 down to 0.5 % in 2007.3 Under Treaty provisions, the European
Commission provided supranational regulation of Member States in their specific bank rescues
and more general support schemes involving state subsidies to banking. It imposed constraints
on the amount of aid each bank could receive. It also required ‘compensation’ in the form of
punitive asset sales and price restraints on individual banks in receipt of specific aid.
In this article, we address the following questions. How well did the European Commis-
sion deal with the particular circumstances of bank bailouts? Was it right to intervene in
national aid decisions? Did its interventions result in markets that were more or less
competitive than would have emerged otherwise? Was it more intent on compensating rivals
or on restoring competition? Could its decisions have been better designed to benefit
consumers? Our focus is on specific aid granted to individual banks, the Commission’s
unusual choice of ‘compensatory measures’ in relation to banks, and the impact of restruc-
turing aid and ‘compensation’ on bank competition.
Both the specific rescues and dozens of general schemes were reviewed by the Commis-
sion for compliance with Article 107 TFEU. This put enormous pressure on the Commis-
sion’s resources, especially as the urgency of rescue and restructuring (R&R) aid cases made
them particularly difficult to deal with. Following the wording of Article 107, state aid for
most sectors, including finance, falls under the competence of DG Competition. This
reinforces the view that it is appropriate to evaluate the success of the Commission’s
interventions in national state aid decisions in the context of its role as protector of
competitive markets, in addition to any achievements in stabilising (or not further destabil-
ising) financial markets. Although the Commission was a stabilising influence in the heat of
the crisis, we find that it did not take the specific externalities created by a financial crisis
sufficiently into account when designing its ‘compensation’ packages for state aid. We also
question its policy of using divestitures as a punishment to prevent future moral hazard.
In section 2, we contrast the justification for both allowing and controlling restructuring
aid to banks as compared to other firms. In section 3, we compare the Commission’s
published guidelines behind rescue and restructuring aid in general with the guidance for
such aid to banks during the financial crisis. Section 4 analyses the Commission’s practice,
in particular through four case studies of how individual banks got into difficulty, received
aid from a Member State, and were required by the Commission to restructure or change
their behaviour. Section 5 brings together the problems highlighted by the case studies.
2 Justification for EC regulation of rescue and restructuring aid
2.1 General principles
The prime motivation for Article 107 was to facilitate trade between Member States (and
later, more ambitiously, in a single European market) by maintaining a level playing field on
which firms in different parts of Europe can compete fairly.4 State aid causes cross-border
2 This figure refers to the maximum amount of aid approved by the European Commission including schemes
and ad hoc interventions. The subsidy element was less than a tenth of this. See section 4.1.
3 European Commission (2010) ‘State Aid Scoreboard’, Autumn update, COM(2010) 701.
4 Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union prohibits any aid that threatens to
distort competition insofar as it could also affect trade between Member States. Article 107(2) provides very
limited automatic exemptions for aid to individuals and for damage due to natural disasters. Article 107(3) sets
out some further circumstances where aid may possibly be justified.
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externalities when there is actual or potential cross-border trade. In particular, it may
commercially disadvantage firms located in other states. For example, in the context of a
declining market, R&R aid may be used by one state to keep its less efficient local firm
going until a more efficient firm located in another state is forced to exit. Regulation of such
aid can ensure a more efficient industry (e.g. survival of only the most efficient firms).
Furthermore, regulation of state aid can limit self-defeating subsidy races in which govern-
ments each seek to protect their home firms with ‘retaliatory’ subsidies.5
Control of state aid can also provide a helpful counterweight for member states to limit
the effect of heavy lobbying by firms for aid. The prospect of bailout encourages reckless
behaviour (moral hazard) by limiting the downside risk to firms. It also encourages firms to
divert resources away from more productive uses in order to seek subsidies. Even without
cross-border externalities, a national government may then be happy to commit to state aid
control by a supranational body as a way of encouraging firms to develop strategies aimed at
improving competitiveness as opposed to rent seeking. National commitment problems may
be magnified in federal states (e.g. the Länder may pursue local interests within Germany),
so the commitment value of the European Commission may be enhanced. Nevertheless, it is
not obvious that commitment value is an appropriate role for the European Commission
unless the moral hazard would have substantial cross-border externalities.
R&R aid is normally granted under Article 107(3c), which may allow ‘aid to facilitate the
development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid
does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest’.
During the crisis, Article 107(3b) was also invoked to allow aid: ‘to remedy a serious
disturbance in the economy of a Member State’.6 Lowe (2009) identified the Commission’s
‘initial objectives’ for state aid policy during the crisis as ‘to preserve financial stability, deal
with the risk of insolvencies and restore lending’. In doing so, he emphasised three
principles that were to ensure: ‘fair competition between Member States;… fair competition
between banks;… [and] a return to normal market functioning’ (p.3). In other words, the aim
was to preserve the single market, to protect competitors when rivals receive aid, and to
move towards eliminating state support. Note that there is no direct mention of the consum-
ers of bank services.
A difficulty for the Commission is that, short of a complete prohibition on restructuring
aid, how can it limit the incentives to lobby for and to grant aid, and how can it determine
how much aid to allow? This question has been particularly difficult for the Commission to
answer in the context of bank bailouts, which amounted to R&R aid on a previously
inconceivable scale. More fundamentally, the whole basis for aid to banks is different to
that for real sector firms. This is because the whole banking system is vulnerable to collapse
if a systemically important bank fails—a version of the too-big-to-fail argument. An
implication is that the Commission might be right to change the basis for any conditions
attached to sanctioning R&R aid, but such a change must be consistent with both the
contagion externality of a bank collapse and the wider objectives of the policy.
2.2 Non-financial firms
Exit is an essential part of the competitive process. If a firm invests unwisely, or provides a
product that is costly to produce and not attractive to customers at the price, then it will lose
5 As Collie (1998, 2002) points out, this may benefit consumers through lower prices, though it must be
balanced by losses to tax payers.
6 This provision was extended at the end of 2010 on the grounds that the ‘serious disturbance’ was continuing.
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customers and, eventually, exit. This confers a positive externality on rivals by freeing both
resources and customers. The prospect of exit provides incentives both for weak firms to
strive to improve and for strong rivals to attract potential customers with a better offer. This
is not explicitly recognised in EC (2004). By EC (2009c), however, there is an explicit
recognition that bailouts weaken ‘incentives for non-beneficiaries to compete, invest and
innovate’ [#28].
When a government finances a failing firm on non-commercial terms, it weakens those
incentives to compete and so can be expected to create a distortion to competition. This
distortion arises even when there is no aid actually given. If firms expect a government
agency to step in to support a failing firm, then a weak firm will be tempted to invest less
wisely and to try less hard to improve. A strong firm will also have less incentive to compete.
The customers of both firms will thus lose out even when the taxpayer is not actually
providing a subsidy.
In its Guidelines on how to implement Article 107 in relation to R&R aid, the Commis-
sion observes that this: ‘is among the most distortive types of State aid. Hence, the general
principle of the prohibition of State aid as laid down in the Treaty should remain the rule and
the derogation from that rule should be limited’ (EC, 1994, #4). Relative to other forms of
state aid, the Commission looks unfavourably on R&R aid, especially at the restructuring
stage. A key manifestation of its displeasure is the requirement for ‘compensatory meas-
ures’, for example, in the form of forced asset sales. We return to this in section 2, but for
now we simply note that it is unsubsidised competitors who are to be ‘compensated’.
The European Commission makes a distinction between ‘rescue’ and ‘restructuring’ aid.
Rescue aid is temporary. It provides breathing space for a firm in crisis to achieve agreement on
a way forward with its creditors. It must be repaid in full within six months or else a
restructuring plan is required. Restructuring aid is to subsidise a recapitalisation and reorgan-
isation of businesses, including the sale or closure of certain activities. If the Commission
approves the restructuring plan, the aid need not be repaid in full on market investor principles
as long as there is adequate ‘burden sharing’with owners and junior creditors. The focus of this
paper is in restructuring aid because of its long-term consequences.
2.3 Why banks are different
There are two reasons why bank failures are different from non-financial firm failures
(Lyons 2009). First, the standard positive externality of exit on rivals can turn negative, in
which case bank failure is contagious. Banks borrow short and lend long, so depositors must
have confidence in the bank’s business. If they fear that a bank might fail, they withdraw
deposits, which leads to a self-fulfilling liquidity crisis even when the bank is objectively
solvent. Panic in one bank can then shake confidence in another. This is why most countries
even pre-crisis provided systemic State aid in the form of a guarantee for retail depositors.
If such a liquidity problem was the only issue, this could easily be dealt with by
temporary support. A far more damaging negative externality arises when a systemically
important bank becomes insolvent. A modern bank is so highly leveraged that bad invest-
ments (e.g. loans against property when borrowers are unable or unwilling to repay as prices
fall; or investment in derivatives backed by such failing assets) quickly reveal a funding gap
in its balance sheet. If wholesale funds are not readily available to fill that gap, assets must
be sold quickly. This depresses asset prices and so also the value of similar assets held by
other banks who may similarly then need to sell in a negative spiral. Banks also trade with
each other and if one bank is unable to pay, counterparty banks would see the value of their
own assets fall, requiring them to rebuild their balance sheet by withholding lending, selling
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assets or borrowing wholesale funds at a crisis premium. Given the global nature of
investment and capital flows, the collapse of a bank in one country can have negative
international externalities, as Lehman so dramatically demonstrated in October 2008.
The second distinctive feature of banks is that they provide an essential input into all other
productive activities—finance. If credit is disrupted, for example by banks trying to rebuild their
balance sheets, this has an immediate and cumulative impact on the real economy. The cost of a
financial crisis is not so much the direct cost of bank bailouts to the taxpayer, but the permanent
loss of output in the subsequent recession and period of slow growth. The consequent loss of
corporate tax revenue has a negative impact on national treasuries and sovereign debt.
Given the negative externalities conferred by a) failing individual banks on the whole
banking market, and b) a failing banking system on economic growth, it is little wonder that
national governments race to bail out their banks in a crisis even though this will itself cause
problems for sovereign debt. Aid totalling €4,589b was approved for banks by EU Member
States over just 2 years (October 2008 to October 2010). Although three-quarters of this took
the form of guarantees which were mostly not called in, it is still a massive amount
compared with, say, aid for manufacturing of around €40b p.a. over the last decade.
The concern with a bank collapse is therefore very different to non-banks. State aid has a
positive externality so the international policy concern is that there may be too little provision.
For example, there may be too little support for banks which are systemically important beyond
national borders, too little support for foreign owned banks operating in a national market, or
too little cooperation in saving multinational banks. Alongside this positive externality of
intervention, there may also be more traditional negative externalities; for example, excessive
deposit guarantees to attract internationally mobile funds away from rivals. Furthermore, once
the banking system has been stabilised, any further subsidies can create similar competitive
distortions to those outlined for real sector firms. This suggests a subtle role for the Commission
in minimising the negative externalities of aid while recognising also the positive spillovers.
One important implication is that rivals benefit from the stability created by bailouts, so it is no
longer obvious that rivals need ‘compensating’.
3 The Commission’s guidance for regulation of restructuring aid
We begin with a brief summary of some general measures adopted by the Commission
designed so that it did not have to investigate every bank that received any support. We then
turn to our main focus, which is differences in the guidance for intervention in specific aid
for ‘real’ versus ‘financial’ firms.
3.1 General measures for banking
The speed with which the banking crisis took hold and the volume of aid granted by Member
States could have overwhelmed the Commission. In order to limit its caseload and provide
guidance to Member States, the Commission issued four Communications between October
2008 and July 2009 on the design and implementation of state aid in favour of banks.7 EC
7 These are the: Banking Communication (European Commission 2008); Recapitalisation Communication
(European Commission 2009a); Impaired Assets Communication (European Commission 2009b); Restructur-
ing Communication (European Commission 2009c). There was also a parallel communication providing a
temporary Community framework for State aid measures to support access to finance for non-banks
(European Commission 2009d).
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(2008) also legitimised a second line of justification for R&R aid for banks by invoking
Article 107(3b), which may allow aid ‘to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a
Member State’. The guidance relates to two types of aid: general schemes to aid all banks;
and ad hoc (i.e. specific) interventions in support of a particular bank.
General schemes are designed for fundamentally sound banks whose viability problems
are inherently exogenous and due to extreme financial market conditions, not due to
individual inefficiency or excessive risk-taking. These schemes are similar to a block
exemption and must meet certain conditions in order to be approved, including time limits,
non-discrimination against foreign subsidiaries and the avoidance of undue distortive effects
on neighbouring markets. Appropriate remuneration charges must restrict the aid element to
a minimum and structural adjustment measures for the financial sector as whole will
eventually be required to reduce the likelihood of a future crisis. Once the rules of a Member
State’s support scheme are approved by the Commission (under Article 107(3b)), individual
banks receiving aid only under the approved scheme receive no scrutiny and are not subject
to any compensatory or punitive measures.8
This article focuses on those banks that got into difficulty due to their own inefficiency,
poor asset-liability management or risky strategies, and for which the general schemes
provided insufficient support. Aid for such banks requires separate notification and a
detailed restructuring plan to be assessed by the Commission on similar, but not identical,
terms to the general R&R guidelines.
3.2 Comparison of pre-crisis R&R Guidelines (2004) and Financial Sector Restructuring
Communication (2009)
The pre-crisis R&R Guidelines contain the underlying ‘balancing’ principle that restructur-
ing aid can only be justified if any distortions it creates (e.g. negative effect on competitors)
are offset by other benefits (e.g. employment, competition). Furthermore, there must be
‘adequate compensatory measures in favour of competitors’ (EC 2004; R#31, emphasis
added).9 The aid and consequent restructuring plan are to be judged against three criteria.
First, the plan must convince the Commission that the firm will be restored to long-term
viability. The firm should not have to return for further aid in the future—the ‘one time, last
time’ principle that has too often been honoured only in the breach. Second, the aid and plan
should avoid ‘undue distortions of competition’. Third, the aid should be the minimum
necessary and include a ‘substantial own contribution’.
The motivation for the second criterion is that aid ‘can shift an unfair share of the burden
of structural adjustment and the attendant social and economic problems onto other pro-
ducers who are managing without aid’ [R#31]. The Commission therefore demands ‘com-
pensatory measures’ such as ‘…divestment of assets, reductions in capacity or market
presence and reduction of entry barriers…[taking] account of the market structure and the
conditions of competition…’ [R#39]. These must be additional to ‘closure of loss-making
activities … [which are anyway] necessary to restore viability’ [R#40]. This concept of
compensation for competitors rests awkwardly with the aims of a competition authority.
While it may appear that saving a failing firm enhances the competitive structure of an
industry, it reduces the incentives to compete in the first place (see section 2.2). From this
perspective, it is no longer obvious that, for example, capacity reduction or divestment to
competitors will leave consumers better off than if there was a prohibition on restructuring
8 See Neven and de la Mano (2009).
9 We use R#x to refer to paragraph x of EC (2004).
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aid. There is no requirement for the Commission to develop a counterfactual against which
to judge either aid or compensation.
The third criterion demands a substantial owner contribution alongside the support
provided by the state. For example, the Guidelines say that for large firms the own
contribution should be at least 50 % of the total [R#44]. This demonstrates the owners’
belief that the aid will result in long term viability as well as limiting the advantage over
competitors. Furthermore, the ‘own contribution’ encourages firms to ask only for the
minimum necessary—they should be willing to sell profitable assets or contribute more of
their own capital or raise market funding to lend credibility to their claim. Put another way,
the own contribution element is to reduce an adverse selection problem in asking for aid.
The Financial Sector Restructuring Communication was adopted to tailor the general
R&R guidelines to the specifics of bank bailouts. It makes some important modifications to
each of the above three criteria. First, it makes the restoration of viability the ‘first and
foremost’ requirement [F #5].10 This is consistent with the negative exit externality on rivals
(see section 2.3 above) and the importance of limiting contagion to the real economy. It
similarly fits with the changing basis for aid under Article 107(3)—from (c) ‘development of
certain activities’ to (b) ‘remedy of a serious disturbance to the economy’.11 As in the earlier
Guidelines, there is no requirement for the Commission to identify a counterfactual by which
to judge the necessity for aid in the first place.12 The other changes are more subtle.
Second, there is a change in justification for compensatory measures. There continues to
be an element of compensating rivals but in a crucial way it goes further by introducing
behavioural ‘remedies’. In order to avoid aid being used to the detriment of non-
beneficiaries, subsidised banks must not set prices that undercut rivals (e.g. offering high
savings rates). It looks odd for a competition authority to facilitate collusive or at least price-
following behaviour in this way. Recall why so much aid to banks was justified. In contrast
to the usual case for R&R aid, bank bailouts convey a positive externality on rivals if exit
would have caused or worsened a systemic crisis. If, then, the aid was already benefitting
rivals, why should they need compensation?13 This is particularly important given the
danger of zombie banks which absorb savings and withdraw lending as they rebuild their
own capital, to the detriment of lending to the non-financial sector and causing a major
recession. As Beck et al. (2010) point out, there was insufficient lending capacity in the
banking system at the time, which is in stark contrast to non-bank R&R cases which
typically arise in the context of excess capacity in an industry.
Needless to say, the Commission makes all the right noises about wanting to minimise
distortions to competition. It says it compares alternatives to identify ‘more market oriented,
less costly or less distortive options’ [F #9]. Where a merger option ‘would result prima facie
in a significant impediment to effective competition, it should not be allowed unless the
distortions to competition are addressed by appropriate remedies’ [F #19]. There must be no
acquisition of competing businesses for at least 3 years. Effective and proportionate meas-
ures should be ‘tailor-made to address the distortions’ [F #30]. The extent of compensatory
measures should depend on the amount of aid and the characteristics of market (e.g. market
share, behavioural remedies, facilitated entry). Divestiture and measures that reduce activity
10 We use F#x to refer to paragraph x of EC (2009c). See Bomhoff et al. (2009) for an insider view of the
Communication.
11 This had been established in the Banking Communication (EC 2008).
12 An explicit counterfactual is recommended in Lyons et al. (2008).
13 Although, the negative externality of exit may be felt by banks that are not necessarily rivals in a particular
market, the systemic benefits matter more than bilateral effects.
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should favour entry and avoid retrenchment behind national borders. In our case studies, we
illustrate how the practice often falls short of these aspirations.
Third, there was a new purpose allocated to the ‘own contribution’ element, including the
revised terminology of ‘burden sharing’. The adverse selection argument is replaced by an
emphasis on moral hazard. The expectation of bailout has always been high for banks
because they are very aware of their systemic importance. The moral hazard for real sector
firms in most countries is much smaller. The justification for the own contribution element in
EC (2009c) is therefore changed to make it a punishment for reckless past behaviour. Unlike
in the R&R Guidelines, there is no guidance on the expected size of own contribution. The
Commission hopes that by raising the expectation of punishment, this will provide an
incentive for sustainable bank strategies in the future. This explains why it singles out
banks in trouble due to a faulty business model for mandatory restructuring (Neven
and de la Mano 2009). However, it does not explain why this is the most efficient
way to reduce future moral hazard.
It is worth reflecting more generally on the economic purpose of punishment. Four
purposes can be identified: retribution; incapacitation; communication of social norms;
and deterrence. Pure retribution or vengeance have little economic role as they are backward
looking and do not directly affect economic behaviour, even though they may serve a social
purpose in assuaging public anger with bankers. ‘Incapacitation’ in the form of firing
executives responsible for poor strategy is only shutting the stable door after the horse has
bolted. Legal philosophers suggest there is a further role for punishment as a method of
communicating acceptable social norms.14 Punishment signals society’s displeasure to the
offender in the hope that he or she will repent and change their future behaviour. Similarly,
others observing the punishment will have a stronger moral obligation against reckless
behaviour if they see it being punished. In the case of bankers post-crisis, we note that there
has been little in the way of repentance, and punitive bank and bonus taxes do not seem to
have changed the corporate culture of banks.
This leaves deterrence as the primary economic aim of punishment. The fear of
future punishment is supposed to deter individual banks from ‘reoffending’, and more
generally to deter other banks from getting into financial difficulty, because they
should not see bailout as an attractive option. This economic deterrence motive for
punishment should therefore be the benchmark for judging the Commission’s ‘burden
sharing’ argument for reducing future moral hazard. Burden sharing in the event of a
bailout should also be compared with the tools of prudential regulation (e.g. minimum
Tier 1 capital ratios, bonus schemes that do not encourage excessive risk) as a means
of addressing moral hazard.
Insight into the Commission’s own view of burden sharing is provided by a recent speech
by the Vice President of the European Commission responsible for Competition Policy. His
speech is directed at German Landesbanken because of where it was given, but it is clearly
intended to apply to all subsidised banks:
“Who should share the burden of rescuing and restructuring subsidised Landes-
banken? I believe that institutional shareholders should be held responsible for their
mistakes or their reckless risk-taking. I can see no reason why the burden of restruc-
turing Landesbanken should be transferred wholly onto taxpayers; there must be a
rational and fair way to share the burden with shareholders. Sharing the burden would
also affirm a sense of justice. We cannot accept a system that rewards recklessness and
14 For an introduction to the philosophy of legal punishment, see Duff (2008).
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punishes prudence. We cannot accept a system that privatises profits and socialises
losses. Sharing the burden would address the moral-hazard issue, because we all agree
that we need to send clear signals and build incentives for more prudent behaviour in
the future” (Almunia 2011, emphasis added). This seems to draw on a wide range of
the theories of punishment.
4 The Commission’s practice of regulating R&R aid to banks
The purpose of this section is to examine how the Commission has applied the principles
discussed above to banks requiring restructuring aid. We begin with a brief quantification of
the volume of aid, before turning to our four case studies. We focus on specific (ad hoc) aid
because this is more likely to be market-distorting than are general measures available
to all banks.
4.1 Extent of aid to the financial sector during the crisis
According to the Commission’s State Aid Scoreboard, the Commission took more than 200
decisions for the financial sector based on Article 107(3b) in the period between 1 October
2008 and 1 October 2010.15 These decisions authorised, amended or prolonged 41 schemes
(20 guarantee schemes, 14 recapitalisation schemes and 7 impaired assets measures) and
addressed with individual decisions the situation of forty financial institutions. These
financial crisis measures were taken in 22 Member States. Table 1 shows the total
value of these measures that were approved in principle, and Table 2 shows the actual
take-up of aid.
Table 1 shows that the equivalent of 30 % EU GDP was at risk in supporting the
financial system, and a further 9 % EU GDP was made available to rescue or
restructure individual banks (i.e. ad hoc aid). Table 2 shows that only 21 % of the
support that was available under general schemes, and 34 % of the aid available
through ad hoc measures, was actually taken up. To the extent that banks paid what
was considered a ‘market rate’ for this support, it does not constitute a subsidy.16 The
last column of Table 2 shows that the subsidy element was 25 % of the aid used in
general schemes and 43 % in ad hoc schemes. This reduces the actual subsidy to
around 3 % EU GDP, split roughly equally between general and ad hoc schemes. Of
15 Autumn 2010 update: COM(2010) 701, 01.12.2010.
16 In the case of a state guarantee, according to the Banking Communication, this price should be as close to
the market price as possible and be based on the risk profile of the banks. In the case of recapitalisation, the
Commission considers the Eurosystem recommendations of 20 Nov 2008 as an adequate method to determine
the price of recapitalisation for fundamentally sound banks. This method involves the calculation of a price
corridor on the basis of different components which should also reflect the specific features of individual
institutions and of member states. The commission accepts a minimum remuneration based on the above
methodology for fundamentally sound banks. The remuneration is then differentiated at the level of an
individual bank on the basis of its risk profile and other relevant parameters. In the case of asset relief
measures, as stated in the Impaired Assets Communication, assets should be valued on the basis of their
current market value, whenever possible as a first stage. Then any transfer of assets covered by a scheme at a
valuation in excess of the market price will constitute State aid. As a second stage, the Commission considers
a transfer value reflecting the underlying long-term economic value of the assets as an acceptable benchmark
indicating the compatibility of the aid amount as the minimum necessary. Adequate remuneration is then
required to be secured by the state. If the transfer value of the assets exceeds the real economic value, the aid
element contained in the measures is considered correspondingly larger. Furthermore, it must be accompanied
by far-reaching restructuring.
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course, the crisis was spread unevenly across Member States, with some countries
(e.g. Ireland) providing proportionately much more aid than others.
Since the Commission identifies the actual amount of aid as one of the factors determin-
ing the extent of restructuring required for distressed banks, the valuation and pricing of the
aid measures is crucial for the restructuring assessment. However, this can be a difficult
exercise due to the extreme market conditions. For example, the value of a recapitalisation
requires the risk premium for the distressed bank to be determined. Information before the
crisis may underestimate the risk profile of a bank but information during the crisis may
overestimate it. With regard to the valuation of impaired assets, the difficulties lie in both the
determination of current market value and real economic value of the assets in the
absence of a liquid market. The future shape of a restructured bank can hang on such
Table 1 Value of measures approved by the Commission (1 October 2008 to 1 October 2010)
Amount of aid approved
by the Commission
% of EU-27 GDP (2009)
Schemes approved, of which €3479b 30
Guarantee schemes €3026b 26.0
Recapitalisation schemes €349b 3.0
Asset relief schemes €62b 0.5
Liquidity facilities €42b 0.4
Ad hoc measures in favour of individual
financial institutions, of which
€1110b 9
Guarantee measures €459b 3.9
Recapitalisation measures €197b 1.5
Asset relief measures €340b 2.8
Liquidity facilities €114b 0.8
Total €4589b 39
Source: DG Competition
Table 2 Actual use of aid approved by the Commission (2009)
Actual use 2009 Subsidy element 2009
Schemes approved, of which €727b €181b
guarantee schemes €613b €77b
recapitalisation schemes €95b €95b
asset relief schemes €1b €1b
liquidity facilities €18b €9b
Ad hoc measures in favour of individual financial institutions,
of which
€379b €171b
guarantee measures €214b €51b
recapitalisation measures €46b €44b
asset relief measures €108b €74b
liquidity facilities €11b €2b
Total 2009 €1107b €352b
Total 2008 €1236b €237b
Source: DG Competition
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technicalities and the Commission’s ability to measure the aid under huge pressure of
time and economic crisis.
4.2 Case studies of ad hoc aid to individual banks
We proceed by examining four case studies of banks in financial distress. The individual
crisis that precipitated each rescue arose at different times during the period, across different
countries and with different ownership structures. The forms of intervention included
guarantees, recapitalisation, impaired asset underwriting, nationalisation, facilitated merger,
and forced divestiture. We chose the cases to reflect the breadth of experience, but we do not
claim that the sample is selected scientifically to be representative, as opposed to illustrative,
of Commission interventions. The selected banks include a specialised mortgage bank
(Northern Rock), a publicly owned bank (WestLB), a cross-border banking group (Fortis
Bank), and a crisis merger of two banks with substantial retail market overlaps (Lloyds-
HBOS). Table 3 summarises the background to the four cases.
We ask four questions in each case. What caused the bank to get into difficulty? What aid
was granted by the Member State? What ‘own contribution’ and ‘compensatory measures’
were agreed with the Commission? Was the Commission’s intervention beneficial to com-
petition and consumers? It is not possible to be precise in answering the last question
because formally the Member State must present a set of measures to the Commission for
its approval. However, the responsible state agency will talk to the Commission and
anticipate its response before presenting those measures as part of the restructuring plan.
Depending on domestic politics, it may then claim all the measures as its own good ideas, or
that it had been forced into them by Brussels. It is therefore not possible to identify the
precise role of the Commission. In the case studies, we adopt the convention of presenting
all ‘own contributions’ and ‘compensation’ as having been extracted by the Commission. In
doing so, we acknowledge that some countries might have imposed at least some of these
measures even without the Commission’s discipline.
4.2.1 Northern Rock17
Northern Rock (NR) was the fifth largest UK mortgage bank and had been growing rapidly.
Its balance-sheet was £113.5b (end-June 2007) with a staff of 6000 persons and it had 77
branches throughout the UK. It was also present in Ireland, Denmark and Guernsey. Its core
activity was residential mortgage lending which represented more than 90 % of outstanding
loans to customers. NR’s lending had grown rapidly over the previous 8 years since it had
demutualised, and the bank roughly trebled its share of the UK mortgage market over that
period. In the first half of 2007, it achieved gross lending of £19.3b and net lending of
£10.7b, giving it a 9.7 % market share of UK gross mortgage lending and 18.9 % of net
mortgage lending. In 1998, retail deposits had constituted its main source of funding, but this
expansion was dependent on its ability to raise money in wholesale markets at a lower rate of
interest than its lending rate. It had to keep raising wholesale funds (securitised notes and
covered bonds) both to repay its short term borrowing and to fund its lending. When
wholesale funding dried up due to turbulence in the global financial markets in mid 2007,
NR could no longer meet its funding needs. NR had been providing mortgages in excess of
the value of the property, and when house price growth faltered this also led to an increase in
17 See the decision text of the European Commission State aid case no. C14/2008 for detailed information on
the case.
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defaults on NR’s outstanding loans. On 14 September, it requested Bank of England support
as lender of last resort. As the news became public, there was a classic run on the bank, with
queues of depositors outside branches wanting to withdraw their entire savings. NR was the
first European casualty of the financial crisis.
In September 2007, the UK authorities stepped in to stop the immediate panic.
& To the extent that they were not covered by the UK deposit guarantee scheme, a full
guarantee was provided on all existing retail deposits18 (max £20b with remuneration
charges);
& This guarantee was accompanied by a liquidity facility provided by Bank of England
(£25b with commitment charges);
& The guarantee was extended from existing retail deposits to new retail deposits and
several types of unsubordinated wholesale deposits (£10b with monthly charges).
In Feb 2008, after unsuccessful attempts to find a private sector buyer, NR was taken into
public ownership.
The Commission decided that the purchase of the shares from the existing share-
holders did not constitute state aid to the bank or the former shareholders since the
shareholders were compensated on the basis of the value of the company. After
nationalisation, the UK authorities submitted an initial restructuring plan. However,
as the financial crisis deepened in autumn 2008 with the fall of Lehman Brothers and
deterioration in the housing market, the plan had to be amended. NR impairment
charges were well above the average for other banks. A final plan was submitted in
June 2009. The plan proposed to split NR into a ‘good bank’ (BankCo) which would
be privatised in due course, and a ‘bad bank’ or asset management company
(AssetCo) which would hold the remaining, underperforming assets. The plan required
additional aid measures:
18 The Financial Service Compensation Scheme, is a UK national scheme funded by the banks which, at the
time, compensated at least 90 % of a maximum £35,000 for retail deposit holders in case of the failure of a
financial institution.
Table 3 Comparison of the four cases
Bank Member
State
Balance sheet
size as at
31.12.2006
Business model
and ownership
Time of the financial
distress
Types of State
interventions
Northern Rock UK £101b (approx.
€150bn at
the time)
Specialised
mortgage
bank
Since September 2007 State guarantee,
liquidity facility,
nationalisation,
recapitalisation
WestLB Germany €285.3b Universal bank,
public owned
bank
Since February 2008 State guarantee,
asset relief
Fortis Bank Belgium,
Luxembourg,
Netherlands
€675b Universal bank Since September 2008 Recapitalisation,
liquidity facility,
other measures to
facilitate the sale
to BNP Paribas
Lloyds TSB-
HBOS
UK HBOS: £591b HBOS: universal
bank specialised
in mortgage and
savings; Lloyds
TSB: universal bank
HBOS: Since Sep 2008 Recapitalisation,
state guaranteeLloyds TSB:
£344b
Lloyds Banking
Group (as a result
of the acquisition):
since Jan 2009
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& For BankCo: continuation of the guarantees on retail and wholesale deposits (£21.6b
with remuneration charges), a recapitalisation (£1.4b in the form of ordinary shares) and
a contingent liquidity facility (£1.5b with monthly commitment charges).
& For AssetCo: a guarantee on the wholesale deposits that remained with it (£8.3b with
monthly charges), the liquidity facility granted to NR (increased to £23b and with lower
commitment fees), recapitalisation (£1.6b in the form of debt-equity swap) and a
working capital facility (£2.5b with commitment charges).
The Commission required compensatory measures that imposed absolute limits on
lending, borrowing and balance sheet size:
& New lending by BankCo capped to £4b in 2009, £9b in 2010 and £8b in 2011;
& In the event that BankCo remains in Temporary Public Ownership (TPO) after 2011, a
lending cap of £8b until end-2013 or exit from TPO;
& BankCo retail deposit balances across the United Kingdom, Ireland and Guernsey
capped at £20b until end-2011;
& In the event that BankCo remains in TPO in 2012 and 2013, the retail deposit cap must
be £23b for 2012 and £26b for 2013 or exit from TPO.
There were also measures to limit the ability of NR to compete aggressively in the UK
market, including precedent-setting price controls:
& BankCo, must not rank within the top three Moneyfacts mortgage categories for 2- 3-, or
5-year fixed or variable mortgages (excluding mortgages with a loan-to-value ratio
greater than 80 % and products for first time buyers) until end-2011 or exit from TPO;
& Existing subordinated debt must remain in AssetCo and no principal or coupons can be
paid on subordinated debt instruments (unless contractually obliged to do so);
& No engagement in acquisitions of shares in other firms or promotion of the Government
guarantee arrangements or ownership;
& No new economic activities by AssetCo, apart from the activities necessary to provide
operational support to BankCo, until the operational separation between BankCo and
AssetCo is completed.
Finally, there were measures to ensure the exit of public ownership and state intervention
including:
& Commitment to exit majority State ownership;
& Commitment to release the specific retail deposit guarantee by public notice;
& Wholesale guarantee arrangements related to BankCo must be lifted by end-2010.
NR was not a systemically important bank in the sense that even if it had collapsed, it
would probably not have brought down other banks. It first got into difficulty a year before
the Lehman collapse and before the Commission’s declaration of a ‘serious disturbance in
the economy’. Its distress arose from a fragile funding model and risky loan portfolio. Its
crisis was precipitated by market conditions and it did not immediately trigger problems
elsewhere in the banking system. It is known that there were several private offers to buy
Northern Rock, but these were rejected by shareholders and the Commission does not say
why these offers were unacceptable.19 The Commission has no apparent decision criteria by
which to judge whether a private bid offer should be acceptable or not, so the cost of a
19 For example, were the shareholders holding out for a better offer or did potential buyers require an even
bigger State subsidy to take on NR?
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private bid offer could not be assessed against the cost of state aid measures. More generally,
there was no attempt to construct a counterfactual.
The Commission concluded that the new bank, BankCo, would be viable on the basis of
stress tests on its revised business and the replacement of senior management. It also
concluded that the aid was limited to the minimum necessary. Given that the bank was
nationalised and it was already under new management and narrowly focused on the
mortgage market, there is apparently little in the way of pure punishment in the remedies.
The same cannot be said of the compensatory measures. These included the withdrawal of a
bank-specific State guarantee and timely exit from public ownership, both of which are
entirely appropriate. However, ‘compensation’ also included lending and retail deposit caps,
and direct restrictions of price competition.20 In the context of a massive credit squeeze, this
is punishing consumers as much as compensating rivals.21
In December 2011, the Commission approved NR’s acquisition by Virgin Money for
£747m (plus some future conditional payments) based on the simplified procedure and
without any conditions. Virgin Money is a relatively recent entrant into banking services and
does not provide a full service range, so there were no negative competition issues in relation
to the merger which potentially creates a long-term competitor.22 However, as our discussion
of the Lloyds case will show, it is unlikely that a bank on this scale will provide effective
competition for some years.
4.2.2 WestLB23
WestLB is a European commercial bank based in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), Ger-
many’s largest federal state. With total assets of €285 billion and 5,862 staff (both at 31
December 2006), it is a major German financial services provider. It is the central institution
for the savings banks of NRW and Brandenburg, and as an internationally operating
commercial bank it acts as their link to global financial markets. In partnership with the
savings banks, WestLB offers the services of a universal bank, providing lending, structured
finance, capital market and private equity products, asset management, transaction services
and real estate finance. Until July 2005, along with other German public banks, it profited
from unlimited State guarantees. These were abolished following pressure from the Com-
mission.24 In the following years, West LB expanded into risky business activities such as
proprietary trading and investment management of structured portfolios.
In spring 2007, WestLB was hit by high losses from one of its proprietary trading desks.
Turbulence in financial markets also affected its structured portfolio investments, which
included exposure to U.S. subprime real estate loans. It was unable to refinance the
20 NR’s market share in the UK mortgage market decreased in 2008 and 2009.
21 According to the BBC (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8205443.stm), the Building Societies Associ-
ation (i.e. rival mortgage lenders organised as mutuals) had lobbied the Commission for formal limits on new
lending to prevent NR having an ‘unfair advantage’, but the report makes no mention of price controls. The
importance of lobbying by rivals is confirmed in section 5.3 of Didziokaite and Gort (2010).
22 As part of the sale conditions, the UK Treasury required NR’s 74 branch network to be retained and
eventually expanded. There should also be no further compulsory redundancies. These commitments at least
incentivise a minimum scale of activity. Virgin Money had only a handful of ‘money stores’.
23 See the decision text of the European Commission State aid cases no.C43/2008, N531/2009 and N555/
2009 on which this section is based. See also Carletti and Vives (2009) for an analysis of state aid to
Landesbanken in the 1990s and early 2000s. They also review an important earlier bank state aid case on
Credit Lyonnais, which had got into difficulty due to bad lending (including property and film-
production studios).
24 Certain public mission activities were also floated off as NRW Bank.
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structured portfolio by selling notes on the market and the mark-to-market loss pushed
capital ratios towards the regulated minimum level. In February 2008, the public owners25
announced the transfer of the crisis-ridden assets from WestLB to a special purpose vehicle
(Phoenix Light) and provided a risk shield in the form of a guarantee of €5b on the
asset portfolio, with a commission of less than 1 % p.a.. The Commission opened an
in-depth investigation on 1 Oct 2008 and approved a modified aid and restructuring
plan on 12 May 2009.
The following compensatory measures were required to limit the absolute size of WestLB
and reduce its participation in risky activities. It was required to:
& reduce its assets by 50 % by 31 March 2011;
& reduce its risk-weighted-assets by a similar amount (i.e. from €104b to €52b);
& focus on three core business areas: transaction banking; medium-sized companies, and
savings banks partnerships; and corporate banking, capital markets and specialised
financing.
To achieve this, the bank was required to divest almost all subsidiaries (19) and stream-
line its domestic and foreign branch network.26 Pending the divestitures, risk reduction had
to be achieved by:
& Structural separation of capital market activities, corporate banking, capital market and
specialised financing;
& Restrictions on business volume in these activities;
& Stopping proprietary trading activities;
& Client-related trading to be restricted to locations in Dusseldorf, New York, Hong Kong
and London.
Furthermore, Germany committed to initiate the change of the bank’s ownership structure
through a public tender procedure before the end of 2011.27 According to the Commission,
the change of ownership was vital for the bank to abandon its risky business model and to
return to viability.
A year later, WestLB was still engaged in proprietary trading.28 Nor did the May 2009
plan restore viability. In September 2009, Germany notified the Commission of its intention
to grant additional aid through the assumption of risk in relation to impaired assets. This
covered:
& bonds issued by the special purposes vehicle Phoenix Light, which was holding struc-
tured securities (€23b);
& collateralised debt obligations (€2.9b);
& a portfolio of structured securities (€6.4b) with remuneration charges.
The owners of WestLB also agreed with the German government’s Financial Market
Stabilisation Fund (SoFFin) to a restructuring to include a ‘bad bank’ which would take over
and wind up WestLB’s portfolio of toxic and non-strategic assets. Since the bad bank was
expected to make losses, SoFFin provided:
25 State of North Rhine-Westphalia, NRW Bank, two regional savings banks associations and two municipal
associations.
26 It had to: close 5 of its 11 locations in Germany (by 2010) limiting the locations to Dusseldorf, Berlin,
Frankfurt, Hamburg, Munich and Stuttgart; and reduce its locations outside Germany from over 30 to 7 (by
2010), limiting the locations to London, New York, Hong Kong, Moscow, Sydney, Istanbul and Sao Paulo.
27 See point 39 and 68 in the decision text.
28 See State Aid N249/10–Germany, published 22.06.2010.
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& equity (€3b) in the form of silent participation convertible into ordinary shares;
& a guarantee (€1b) to cover further potential losses by WestLB’s owners.
In December 2009, Germany submitted a revised restructuring plan which took into
account the additional State aid since the Commission’s decision of 12 May 2009. This
proposed:
& Transfer of the Phoenix portfolio (€24b) to the ‘bad bank’ along with the original risk
shield (€5b);
& Spinning off the remaining portfolio (€61b).
At least five more affiliate companies than in the earlier plan were also to be sold. The
Commission found that these measures did not obviously fall under the general authorisation
for asset relief measures (EC, 2009b) and another formal investigation was opened. The final
decision was not available at the time of writing, but the Commission has required yet
another restructuring plan to be submitted by 15th February 2011. According to Commis-
sioner Almunia (2011): “The plan will have to account for all the aid received and explain
how the bank intends to achieve long-term viability”.
Once again, the Commission provided no consistent counterfactual as to what would
have happened if WestLB had been allowed to fail. Its first decision was assessed under
Article 107(3c) because this was before it declared there was a serious disturbance to the
economy. However, its later investigations were under Article 107(3b), implicitly acknowl-
edging it was a systemically important bank. Even without the final decision, we know that
WestLB has kept coming back for more aid. The first restructuring plan obviously did not
meet the requirement of a return to viability and ‘one time, last time’ aid.
A major problem has been due to the complexities of public ownership in the German
federal system. The Landesbanken are controlled by regional governments and savings
banks. This makes it difficult for the German federal authority to intervene directly. It
appears also to have led to a lack of transparency in declaring the full extent of the problems
and then in implementing restructuring plans. The lack of full disclosure of impaired
assets may have been encouraged by the hope that fewer structural measures would
be required in compensation.
In order to achieve the targeted balance sheet reduction proposed in the plan of May
2009, it was expected that “WestLB would fully dispose a number of assets grouped in an
exit portfolio”.29 Regarding the exit portfolio it was planned from the very beginning to
spin-off both structured securities and non-strategic assets of approximately €85 billion (the
so-called ‘PEG’ portfolio, of which the Phoenix portfolio is part) to a so-called ‘bad bank’.
The structure of the bad bank was not agreed among the owners until December 2009, and
this delay played an important role in necessitating the additional aid in September 2009.
Moreover, in the plan of May 2009 Germany committed to initiate the change of the bank’s
ownership structure through a public tender procedure before the end of 2011. However its
implementation has proved elusive. As early as spring 2007, the shareholders (i.e. savings
banks) in WestLB engaged in merger talks with Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (LBBW),
but this failed because of opposition of the State of NRW which wanted to protect
Düsseldorf as a financial centre. Other merger proposals have similarly been thwarted. This
is not to say that such mergers would necessarily be desirable, but it does illustrate a problem
of aid control in federal Member States.30
29 See the decision text of the Commission 22 December 2009, P3.
30 See also the paper by Haken in this volume.
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Ultimately, the long and painful negotiations over rescue and restructuring have proved
futile. In December 2011, after 5 years of crisis and bailouts, the Commission agreed a wind-
down plan to be completed by mid-June 2012. WestLB’s business providing services to
small local savings banks has been absorbed by rival Landesbank Helaba, but this involves
only 400 staff. Attempts to sell other of its businesses have failed and it appears (in May
2012) that they will nearly all have to be wound down. More effective state aid control may
have saved German taxpayers many billions of Euros.
4.2.3 Fortis Bank31
Fortis was created by a series of mergers in the 1990s between Belgian and Dutch banks and
insurers. It was active in retail banking (including private banking), financial services to
business and to institutional customers, asset management and financial services connected
with financial markets. Fortis Bank was the leading retail bank in the Belgian market and
had substantial operations in the Netherlands.32 Fortis Bank Luxembourg and Fortis Bank
Netherlands (FBN) were both subsidiaries of Fortis Bank. As of end-2006, Fortis Bank had
total assets €675b and employed 19,948 staff. In September 2008, it held [20–30]% of the
deposit accounts of Belgian and [10–20]% of the deposits which Belgian non-financial
undertakings have in banks established in Belgium.33
Fortis Bank’s problems arose from a combination of factors. Firstly, in October 2007 it
was involved in the acquisition of ABN AMRO as part of a consortium including Santander
and RBS.34 Fortis Bank undertook to pay €24b towards this acquisition. This required a
huge financing plan which later proved difficult to implement. Secondly, the subprime crisis
and the resulting general loss of confidence, made it extremely difficult to raise the funds
required for the acquisition. Thirdly, its investments in structured credit (€42b) were under-
mined by successive depreciations of asset impairments. Further losses on the structured
credit portfolio amounted to €10b (according to the 2008 annual report of Fortis Bank). This
does not include a further huge loss from ABN AMRO activities as these activities were sold
to the Dutch State in October 2008.35
Attempts to restore solvency caused dissatisfaction among shareholders and undermined
market confidence. Fortis Group’s shares dropped precipitously and there were fears of a
31 See the decision text of European Commission State aid cases no.N574/2008, NN42-46-53A/2008,N255/
2009 and N274/2009 for detailed information on the case.
32 Fortis Bank was a subsidiary of SA Fortis Brussels, itself controlled by Fortis SA/NV and Fortis NV (‘the
Fortis Group’), whose securities are listed inter alia on Euronext Brussels and Euronext Amsterdam.
33 The square brackets are ranges which the Commission uses in public documents to protect business
confidentiality.
34 The figures are from the background information of Fortis Bank in the decision text of the case of Fortis
Bank Netherlands (case no. NN2/2010). RBS acquired the ABN AMRO business units of Global Business
and Markets, Global Transaction Services and the international network; Santander acquired the business units
of Latin America and Antoveneta (Italy) and Fortis Bank acquired business units Netherlands and Private
Banking. At the time of acquisition agreement, business units acquired by Fortis Bank were harboured into
Fortis Bank Netherlands (FBN). On 3 Oct 2008, the Dutch State acquired FBN (including the ANB AMRO
business units) from Fortis Bank.
35 According to the annual report of ABN AMRO for the year 2009, ABN AMRO recorded a loss for the
period of €4.4b. The loss for the period comprises a loss of €4.3b attributable to the RBS acquired businesses,
a loss of €117m attributable to the Dutch State acquired businesses and a loss of € 214m attributable to Central
Items (mainly reflecting the impact of ongoing ramp down activities). For the Dutch acquired business, the
loss was mainly attributable to lower net interest income (€2.1b in the first 9 months of 2009 compared with
€2.4b in the first 9 months of 2008) and an increase of loan loss provisions (€838 m in 2009 compared with
€383m in 2008). Pisani-Ferry and Sapir (2010) point to exposure to Lehman Brothers and sub-prime debt.
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bank run. On Friday 26 September, the Fortis directors concluded that the group could no
longer raise sufficient funds on the market and that if no action was taken there would be a
liquidity deficit of €30b by the following Monday. Over the weekend, Fortis Group
established contacts with various investors who might be interested in bidding for Fortis
Bank as a whole or in purchasing some of the activities. ING made an offer of €1.5 per share.
BNP made an offer of €2 per share, but requested additional guarantees from the Belgian
Government. The latter took the view that, in the light of the closing share price on Friday of
€5.2 per share, those offers were too low and ultimately no formal offer was made. On the
following Monday, the Belgian, Dutch and Luxembourg authorities issued a joint public
statement announcing their commitment to invest €11.2 billion in Fortis Bank:
& The Belgian Government subscribed to a capital increase for Fortis Bank amounting to
€4.7b, thus acquiring a 49.93 % share in Fortis Bank’s capital;
& The Belgian National Bank made emergency liquidity assistance available to Fortis
Bank;
& The Luxembourg Government subscribed to a €2.5b 3-year convertible bond issued by
Fortis Bank Luxembourg. The bond must be converted at maturity, at which point it
would give the Luxembourg Government 49.9 % of the borrower’s capital;
& The Dutch Government subscribed to a capital increase for Fortis Bank Netherland (€4b)
giving it a 49 % share of this bank.
These investments were not sufficient to reassure the markets or creditors. Withdrawals
by institutional customers and companies increased substantially and €36b in deposits was
withdrawn that week alone. Fortis found it impossible to borrow on the interbank market,
except overnight, and had to rely massively on liquidity assistance provided by the Belgian
National Bank. Further state aid was provided in the first week of October 2008.
& The Dutch Government acquired Fortis Bank Netherland for €12.8b.
& Belgium purchased the 50.1 % of Fortis Bank not in its possession for €4.7b.
& The Belgian authorities found a merger partner, and announced that it was selling 75 %
of its share in Fortis Bank to BNP Paribas for €8.25b (to be paid in BNP Paribas shares).
& Luxembourg announced the sale of 16 % of Fortis Bank Luxembourg to BNP Paribas for
€0.8b, thus increasing BNP Paribas’s share of Fortis Bank Luxembourg to 67 % (since
by acquiring Fortis Bank, BNP Paribas would obtain a 50 % share in Fortis Bank
Luxembourg).
& A ‘bad bank’ was set up to take over Fortis Bank’s impaired assets from the structured
credit portfolio for €10b (nominal value of €42b). Belgium was to own 24 %, BNP
Paribas 10 % and the holding company, Fortis Group, the remaining 66 %. The creation
of a ‘bad bank’ vehicle reflected BNP Paribas’s refusal to bear the risk associated with
those products on its balance sheet.
However, the market was not certain that the announced sale of 75 % of Fortis Bank to
BNP Paribas would proceed, and this did not remedy Fortis Bank’s difficulty in accessing
the interbank market. BNP Paribas had to lend it very significant amounts and on 18
November 2008, Belgium introduces a state guarantee mechanism (up to €150b) for Fortis
Bank, with ECB-recommended remuneration charges. The Commission agreed that this
guarantee was compatible with the common market, subject to behavioural constraints and
balance sheet growth restrictions as a safeguard against ‘distortions to competition’. The
Commission further decided (3 December 2008) that the above measures in relation to
Belgium and Luxembourg were the minimum aid necessary and that they would not unduly
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distort competition. It expected that once Fortis Bank formed part of BNP Paribas, it would
be able to return to viability and no compensatory measures were required. It opened a
separate investigation into Dutch support for Fortis Bank Netherlands.36
The Belgian plan was thrown into chaos when, on 12 December 2008, the Court of
Appeal of Brussels suspended the transfer of Fortis Bank from the Belgium State to BNP
Paribas and requested a consultation with the shareholders of the residual Fortis Group. This
resulted in changes to the terms of the transaction in favour of Fortis Group. The Belgian
authorities responded with further aid measures in favour of Fortis Bank/BNP Paribas, to
compensate for both the concessions granted to Fortis Group shareholders and the
higher than anticipated loss in value Fortis Bank had suffered since the original
agreement was signed.
The additional measures that would benefit Fortis Group included (the figures in the
brackets indicate the element of aid assessed by the Commission):
& increased participation by the Belgian State in RPI (the ‘bad bank’) from 24 % to 43.5 %
capital (saving Fortis Group a loss of €332m)
& guarantee granted on the 90 % of RPI’s senior tranche initially underwritten by Fortis
Bank (saving Fortis Group €0.8–2.2b)
& loan guarantee on €1 billion granted by Fortis Group to Fortis Bank (aid element of
€5.5m);
& guarantee on the interest payment by Fortis Group regarding its obligations to Fortis
Bank up to €2.35b (aid element €37m);
& option granted to Fortis Group with regard to capital gain on BNP Paribas shares
(estimated aid of €503m).
The additional measures that would benefit Fortis Bank/BNP Paribas include:
& purchase of additional impaired assets by RPI from Fortis Bank (additional aid of €500–700m)
& mezzanine (second loss) guarantee accorded by the State on the structured credit
portfolio retained by Fortis Bank (aid element of €250–750m).
Finally the following additional measure by Luxembourg would benefit Fortis Bank
Luxembourg:
& increase of capital by €100m by the Luxembourg government (aid up to €100m).
Once again, the Commission considered the sale to BNP Paribas was the best option for
Fortis Bank and concluded that the aid was the minimum necessary. It would not distort
competition, no compensation was necessary and, surprisingly, there was no revised judge-
ment on burden sharing—Fortis Group shareholders simply ended up with more money
ultimately coming from the state.
The Commission’s state aid decision does not consider the competitive impact of the
merger in any detail. Instead, the merger was assessed separately in a merger inquiry.37 The
Commission’s merger decision required the divestiture of BNP Paribas’s credit card business
in Belgium (PFB) subject to which the Commission found that the merger would not impede
competition. However, there were still two additional commitments by BNP Paribas in the
36 See European Commission State aid cases no. C11/2009, N19/2010 and NN2/2010. The final decision text
was not available at the time of writing. The Commission opened an in-depth investigation having expressed
doubts about whether a loan facility accompanying nationalisation by the Dutch authorities was either the
minimum necessary or at an appropriate interest rate.
37 Case No. M5384 (decided 3rd December 2008).
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aid decision text a few months later (May 2009). These were to the effect that they should
not to compete too aggressively or, as the Commission puts it, that the following measures
were ‘sufficient to restrict potential distortions of competition’:
& Not to acquire other credit institutions in Belgium and Luxembourg, valid for 4 years
and
& To restrict interest rates on internet-account customers if its market share reaches [20–
27.5 %]38
In the state aid decision text of December 2008, the Commission noted that the market
presence of Fortis Bank was reduced by selling its Dutch operations, but the acquisition still
gave BNP Paribas the largest retail deposit base in Europe. In its quarterly results, BNP
Paribas reported net profit of €1.3b in the 3 months to the end of September 2009 (the first to
include Fortis’s contribution)—up 45 % on the same quarter in 2008—of which €277m was
contributed by the core of Fortis Bank.
As noted earlier, the final state aid decision on Fortis Bank Nederland (FBN) was still not
available at the time of writing. In October 2007, the merger of the Dutch activities of Fortis
and ABN AMRO had been allowed subject to the divestiture of certain assets in commercial
banking and factoring.39 Agreement to sell these assets to Deutsche Bank was reached in
October 2008, a couple of weeks after FBN had been nationalised. Meanwhile, in addition to
the nationalisation support package already mentioned, FBN received further recapitalisa-
tion of €2.5b in July 2009 and another €6.9b in November 2009 explicitly to support the
ABN AMRO merger and reorganisation costs. In January 2010, yet another €4.4b was
provided to support a capital shortfall for FBN associated the sale of these businesses. The
sale to Deutsche Bank was eventually completed only in April 2010.
In a press release prior to the publication of a public version of its state aid decision, the
Commission decided that the aid for FBN was not due to excessive risk taking or unsus-
tainable business models, but due to recapitalisation associated with the ABN AMRO
merger and subsequent reorganisation.40 It still proceeded to impose conditions that limit
competition: ‘In order to ensure that the state funding is used solely to consolidate the
viability of the merged entity and not, for instance, for financing an aggressive growth of the
group at the expense of competing banks, the Commission has subordinated its approval of
the aid package to a set of conditions. The conditions include a ban on acquisitions
and a requirement to achieve certain margin profit levels in the private banking
sector, where the bank has a strong position, to avoid that it uses the aid to undercut
competitors’ [emphasis added].
4.2.4 Lloyds TSB/HBOS
LloydsTSB was a universal bank with a reputation for prudent management (at least until the
fateful merger decision that led it to become this case study). Even in 2008, it made a profit
of £0.845b on assets of £436b. HBOS had been created by a merger of the Bank of Scotland
and Halifax, which had been the UK’s biggest building society before demutualising. Their
business model became more aggressive including very large loans to certain favoured
38 This was considered to be a growing market. A complaint had been received by the Commission on 4 Nov
2008 against the state aid granted by the time to Fortis Bank on the grounds that it allowed Fortis Bank to offer
higher interest rates on deposits and on-line savings accounts. Presumably, this complaint was by a competitor.
39 See case M4844, 3rd October 2007.
40 See EC press release IP/11/406, dated 5th April 2011.
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businessmen. Much went into commercial property development. A reckless lending policy
resulted in a £7.4b loss on £690b assets.
At the height of the immediate post-Lehman crisis (September 2008), HBOS was in
severe funding difficulty and a rescue merger was announced. This was apparently initiated
by a private conversation between the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown,
and LloydsTSB chairman Sir Victor Blank. The merger was completed in January 2009
despite objections from the OFT (2008) as the agency responsible for first phase merger
decisions. The OFT was quite reasonably concerned that, for example, in the personal
current account market, the merger would combine shares of 19 % and 14 %, and in the
Scottish market for SME business it would combine shares of around 10 % and 35 % (to
create a balanced duopoly with the equally crippled RBS).41 The government response, with
the support of the Bank of England, Treasury and Financial Services Agency, was to change
the law so the merger could take place without a second phase merger investigation. This
was the first case of such an intervention since the reforming Enterprise Act of 2002 was
meant to take mergers out of political decision making.42
It soon became clear that HBOS assets were more toxic than Lloyds had expected and it
required state aid:
& £17b recapitalisation by the State (43.5 % equity) in January 2009
& £260b of toxic assets temporarily insured
& £6b in rights issue (‘Seaview’ project) taken up by the State
In return, Lloyds offered
& £181b non-core asset reduction plan presented as ‘burden sharing’
– Five business disposals and ten reductions in business size
– Plus the previous £33b sale of two Australian businesses
& £1.5b synergies were promised
& Extension of Lloyds prudent business philosophy throughout the merged entity
– Replacement of HBOS senior managers
The Commission opened a full investigation and the final restructuring plan (December
2009) also required:
& Further £71b core asset reduction as ‘compensatory measures’
– Sale of 632 branches plus the IF internet/tele banking (0 4.6 % market share in personal
current accounts)
– The buyer’s combined share must be <14 %
– 19 % of Lloyds mortgage share to be sold43
& No further acquisitions would be allowed before end-2012
41 Vickers (2008) argues that stability might have been achieved in a less anticompetitive way.
42 The Act does allow for such a political decision on the grounds of public interest though this was intended
to be interpreted narrowly, with national security as the only stated example plus a public interest provision to
maintain media plurality (Whish 2001, p.898). A new public interest “to ensure the stability of the UK
financial system” had to be created in a formal Order to be passed urgently by both Houses of Parliament.
Note that national security and media plurality are appropriately long-term considerations for a merger,
whereas this merger’s contribution to financial stability could only have been short-term at best.
43 This appears to be around 5 % market share.
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Lloyds refer to the divestiture plan as Project Verde and it has to be completed by end
November 2013. The Commission decided that the own contribution “adequately addresses
the issue of moral hazard and prevents the creation of perverse incentives”.
The Commission recognised that the merger was only possible due to State aid, yet it still
allowed it to proceed with relatively minor remedies. This goes against the Restructuring
Communication (EC 2009c) which advocates applying the same standards as in the ECMerger
Regulation.44 The Commission required only a 4.6 % market share to be put up for divestiture,
which would take PCA market share down to 25 % and gross mortgage lending to 19 %.45 The
requirement for the buyer’s combined market share to be less than 14 % limits potential buyers
to new entrants or those with an existing market share of <9.4 %. It is traditionally hard to grow
market share in retail banking. Market shares matter because of low switching on current
accounts and cross-selling of other activities. As can be seen from Table 4, this merger leaves
Lloyds with a powerful position in a newly concentrated market.46 Furthermore, the divestment
is of the weaker assets in the merger (including the TSB brand) which are being carve-out of an
existing business. Merger remedies research shows this to be much less effective in maintaining
competition than would be the sale of a previously stand-alone business.47 It is clear that Lloyds
saw the merger as ‘once-in-a-lifetime opportunity’ because this merger would almost certainly
not have been allowed at any other time.
As part of its response to the financial crisis, the UK government set up an Independent
Commission on Banking headed by Sir John Vickers which reported its final recommenda-
tions in September 2011. ICB (2011, chs.7–8) provides strong evidence that smaller
challengers to the Big Four banks fight to overcome switching costs by providing both
higher deposit rates and lower borrowing rates. Challengers starting from at least a 6 % share
of personal current accounts (PCAs) were much more effective at increasing their share than
were those with 5 % or less. The ICB further observes that most UK banks now have a loan
to deposit ratio (LDR) in the range 100–130 %. A higher LDR implies excessive reliance on
wholesale markets to bridge the funding gap and this leaves a bank with high funding costs
and highly vulnerable to a credit crunch in which wholesale funds dry up. Such a bank
would have to reduce its balance sheet and it would not be an effective competitor.
Applying these findings to the Lloyds divestiture (project Verde), the ICB states that Verde
would have £64b assets and £32b liabilities (i.e. LBR0200%). Although Lloyds claims it would
reduce this before sale, this safeguard necessary for effective competition was not required by the
Commission. Furthermore, a 4.6 % PCA share results in a bank of sub-optimal scale, and judged
by the difficulties of previous entrants unlikely to be an effective competitor (even with an
adequate LBR). The ICB recommends a larger divestiture including at least 6 % of PCAs would
44 See points 18 and 19: “A transparent, objective, unconditional and non-discriminatory competitive sale
process should generally be ensured to offer equal opportunities to all potential bidders. Furthermore, without
prejudice to the merger control system that may be applicable, and while recognising that the sale of an aided
ailing bank to a competitor can both contribute to restoring long-term viability and result in increased
consolidation of the financial sector, where this would result prima facie in a significant impediment of
effective competition, it should not be allowed unless the distortions of competition are addressed by
appropriate remedies accompanying the aid.”[emphasis added]
45 The post-divestiture market share for SME banking will be 21 %.
46 The Commission explicitly acknowledges that the merger eliminates a ‘challenger’ and draws on the
financial regulator’s opinion: ‘The FSA has observed that smaller banks like HBOS tend to behave like
challengers, in the sense that they try to increase their market shares by decreasing price. Conversely, the four
biggest banks (Barclays, Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds TSB and HSBC) tend to behave like harvesters, in
the sense that they focus on extracting value from their existing clients’ [see footnote 47 of the Lloyds decision
letter, N428/2009].
47 See FTC (1999), EC (2005) and Davies and Lyons (2007).
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both make Verde a credible competitor and help address Lloyds’s dominance in this market.
Despite its 40 % ownership stake, the UK government has stated that it cannot change the
conditions agreed with the EC and so cannot compel Lloyds to change its divestiture plans.
At the time of writing (May 2012), Lloyds had three possible ways of selling Verde. The
Cooperative Bank was interested in buying and it would create a bank with 7–8 % of PCAs.
However, the UK financial regulator was concerned about its ability to absorb such a large
acquisition given its leadership and governance systems. It is interesting to note that the Cooper-
ative Bank was Lloyds’s choice as preferred bidder—it has superficially attractive market share
characteristics but would in practice be a weak competitor. A second possibility was to sell to an
investment vehicle (NBNK). It is unclear what that would imply for competition unless it wishes to
purchase another small bank or banks to combine with Verde. Finally, Lloyds’s reserve position
was to float it as a separate entity through an initial public offering, which is highly unlikely to
create a serious competitor. It remains very uncertain whether a strong new competitor will emerge.
5 Lessons from the case studies
Similar standards of ‘compensation’ have been required irrespective of the systemic impor-
tance of a rescued bank. A competition authority is not the right body to judge systemic
importance but it can take advice from central banks and financial regulators. The Commis-
sion appears to have been too ready to consider every bank as being of systemic importance
under Article 107(b). For example, it may have been that Fortis and Lloyds were systemic
but NR and WestLB probably were not.48 Instead, the presumption has been that it is
appropriate for the bank to survive.49 The establishment of a counterfactual should have
48 The Basel Committee on Banking Regulation is currently working on a list of systemically important banks
(see Financial Times 29/03/11, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2069bd4a-5a41-11e0-86d3-00144feab49a.
html#axzz1LHLB567z). Although no such list was available to the Commission at the critical time in
2007–10, it could have sought advice more systematically.
49 This follows from EC (2008) which give a first priority to viability, but it does not mean that these
guidelines are always appropriate. See White (2009) and ICB (2011) for discussions of the too-big-to-fail
argument.
Table 4 Market shares (%) of banks in the UK: 2009/10 (pre-Lloyds divestitures)
Personal current
accounts
Gross mortgage
lending
Unsecured personal
loans
Savings
acccounts
Credit
cards
Lloyds 30 24 25 21 29
RBS 16 13 9 10 19
HSBC 14 11 7 8 13
Barclays 13 10 13 10 23
Santander 12 18 10 12 6
Nationwide 7 8 4 9 5
Big 5 85 76 64 61 90
Lloyds/#2 1.88 1.33 1.92 1.75 1.26
[Source: OFT 2010]
The last row is the ratio of the Lloyds market share to that of the second largest in the market. The absence of a
‘close rival’, as defined by market share, is frequently used by the Commission as a measure of potential
competitive harm in merger cases. See Davies et al. (2011) for econometric evidence
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been an essential first step in the appraisal of aid. Banks which are not systemic could have
been treated the same as any other real sector firm receiving R&R aid. Banks which are
systemic need to be treated differently, in particular in relation to ‘compensation’. In
practice, this simple dichotomy may be difficult to identify, and there will be shades of
grey, so the counterfactual may have to be nuanced.
Excessively high amounts of aid have been allowed in some cases. Even accepting the
desirability of saving a particular bank, there is no serious attempt to judge the required
amount of aid. Of course, differentiating between banks in terms of their risk profile and
performance under abnormal and uncertain market conditions is very hard to achieve given
the massive caseload and global drama of the financial crisis, but it is important to try. There
are two types of error. First, there may be too much aid granted. Indirect evidence for this is
when the aid element is increased without penalty after the agreed plan (e.g. extra aid to
enable Fortis Group shareholders to receive a better deal after a court challenge). Minority
ownership interests or the complexities of a federal state can also hold up the aid and review
process in order to extract better terms.
There is no evidence of too little aid having been allowed, such that it might undermine the
viability of an efficient bank. Our case studies show how state aid has been combined with
nationalisation (NR), slow extended wind-down (WestLB), merger (Lloyds/HBOS) and com-
binations of these (Fortis) to try to achieve viability. This has not always been achieved, but that
is because of the inefficiency of the bank. It has not been for lack of state aid and there has been
no abrupt bankruptcy in Europe (compare Lehman in the USA). Instead, as illustrated by
WestLB, the inefficient bank is allowed to come back for more aid. This undermines the
principle of ‘one time, last time’ and so also the incentive to take difficult actions so as not to get
into future financial difficulty (moral hazard). The need for further subsidies could be because
of a major change in external circumstances (possibly Northern Rock), but our case studies
suggest other factors were often more important. Lack of transparency in the degree of distress
may arise from a desire to minimise the restructuring required by the Commission (WestLB). In
a merger, it can also arise out of the problem of conducting due diligence on an emergency
timescale, combined with the incentive for the selling firm to present its difficulty as a liquidity
problem and not one of solvency (Lloyds/HBOS).
A significant failure by the Commission is that compensation is offered to rivals and is
seen most evidently in behavioural restraints to suppress competition. We highlight three
problems with the Commission’s decisions on compensation. First, it has been applied
without a clear pattern. For example, Northern Rock cannot sell mortgages in the top three
‘best buys’, Fortis must limit its interest rates for internet customers though only if its market
share reaches around 25 %, and FBN must achieve certain margins in private banking; also,
quantitative lending limits were imposed on Northern Rock. On the other hand, there were
no such constraints for WestLB or Lloyds.
Second, and far more importantly, whereas there may possibly be some justification in
limiting price competition by a subsidised firm that would have exited a traditional market,
the underlying justification for bailing out the systemically important banks was different—
it was to prevent a negative externality on the whole banking system. This perspective
should have fundamentally changed the Commission’s attitude to compensation in the form
of anticompetitive behavioural restraints which strike at the heart of the competitive process.
If rivals benefit from the preservation of the financial system, they do not need a further
benefit at the expense of consumers.
Third, the Commission should have been far more concerned about the competitive
effects of market concentration as a result of subsidised mergers (particularly Lloyds). Given
the OFT’s advice that there was a realistic prospect that Lloyds/HBOS would substantially
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lessen competition, and the ICB’s confirmation of its anticompetitive effects, it may not be
too strong to say that the Commission colluded with the UK government to facilitate an
anticompetitive merger with an incomplete remedy. At the very least, it should have required
a competitively effective divestiture. Instead, the Commission adopted a blinkered approach,
excluding viable competition concerns remaining after the unorthodox UK merger approval,
and considered only ‘burden sharing’ (i.e. punishment) in its state aid approval.
Asset reductions were imposed for two reasons. Some were required for viability—i.e. to
exit particularly risky businesses in which the bank had no track record of sustained success.
While this seems sensible, it remains questionable that the Commission should be acting as a
management consultant or even has the competence to do so. Even if it does, implementation
can be delayed for various reasons including local politics (WestLB).
Asset reductions were also imposed for punishment with a view to deterring future moral
hazard. It remains unclear how effective this requirement (e.g. Lloyds’s divestments of non-
core businesses) will be for deterring future banks from getting into difficulties, especially
given the ease with which such assets can be acquired in the future. Furthermore, if the buyer
of the assets reduces the amount of activity associated with them, then the punishment will
have had collateral damage by reducing lending in the economy exactly when it was most
needed. Given that there were no ‘up front’ buyers for most of these asset reductions, it is not
possible to judge the impact, but once again the merger remedies research suggests forced
divestitures are unlikely to be competitively successful without very clear safeguards.50
Neither the Northern Rock sale to Virgin nor the Lloyds divestiture look set to establish
strong competitors in the near future.
One of the justifications for the involvement of the European Commission might have
been to facilitate coordination between national governments in bailing out banks operating
across several Member States. However, in the Fortis case there appears to have been no
problem in the international coordination of state aid between Belgium, the Netherlands and
Luxembourg. The Commission accepted a break-up along broadly Member State lines,
though with substantial involvement of a French bank acquiring the Belgian assets.
A standard condition in our case studies has been to require abstention from mergers for
at least 2 years. This is usually presented as a compensation argument (i.e. so recapitalised
banks cannot go out and acquire assets that an unaided bank could not afford). However,
2 years is not a long period when measured in terms of the evolution of market structure.
Finally, our cases show that merger scrutiny should not be cut short and separated from
state aid appraisal. The BNP Paribus acquisition of Fortis Bank appears to have been
responsibly cautious and does not seem to have led to further difficulties. It was also a
merger that was separately investigated by the Commission, which required structural
remedies for relatively modest market power concerns. In contrast, Lloyds could not believe
its luck in being able to acquire HBOS without a thorough merger investigation, and it
rushed into an acquisition that enhanced its market power. It did not take a lot longer to
discover just how toxic HBOS was. We conclude that mergers should not be excused a full
and rigorous review process even in the heat of a crisis.
6 Conclusion
The European Commission has achieved much in dealing with a huge caseload of bank
rescues. It has almost certainly resulted in more systematic and less distortionary rescue and
50 See FTC (1999), European Commission (2005) and Davies and Lyons (2007).
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restructuring aid than would have been the case in its absence. Furthermore, in the heat of the
crisis, it was probably necessary to be formulaic in implementing its duty to review state aid.
Importantly, even if minimally, the Commission has not required any measures that have
resulted in a bank collapsing for lack of state aid so it appears to have been successful in
terms of stability (though we cannot say if its effect was neutral or positive on that count). 51
Nevertheless, we have found a number of inconsistencies in linking the economic justifica-
tion for the aid and the conditions required by the Commission for its approval.
Our case studies provide evidence for our concerns, although is difficult to attribute the
measures proposed by national authorities as distinct from those imposed by the Commis-
sion. In particular, the Member States should anticipate the commitments required by the
Commission and address them before submitting a restructuring plan. Thus, we cannot
determine the relative contributions of the Member States and the Commission in terms of
limiting the distortion of competition induced by state aid. Nevertheless, it is almost certain
that the extent of aid has been limited by Article 107, but we also find evidence that aid in
excess of the minimum has been allowed. Shareholders were able to use the courts to extract
more aid for themselves. The ‘one time, last time’ stipulation lost credibility not only
because of rapidly changing circumstances as the crisis evolved, but also for other more
political reasons.
Our main focus has been on the conditions the Commission has imposed that affect
competition in banking. We have assessed its principles (as embodied in its guidelines) and
its practice in relation to specific bank bailouts during the financial crisis (as in our case
studies). While acknowledging the enormous stresses and constraints in the context of a
huge financial crisis, we find inconsistencies that could have been avoided. Behavioural
measures on pricing were imposed with little clear pattern. More importantly, ‘no price
cutting’ requirements undermine the competitive process and encourage rivals to set higher
prices. Merger control was addressed inconsistently and divestitures were allowed as carve-
ups of assets, often without up-front buyers. Experience from merger control suggests that
such divestitures are not as successful as divestitures of ongoing businesses to carefully
identified buyers. This applies a fortiori when divestitures were required as a punishment
and unrelated to potential competitive success (e.g. with insufficient scale for a successful
stand-alone business).
An underlying concern is that there was no attempt at a bank-specific counterfactual. The
collapse of a systemic bank would have negative externalities on its rivals, and there is no
justification for measures that further benefit rivals by suppressing competition (e.g. requir-
ing high prices or low volumes of activity). In contrast, if the bank is not systemic, the
justification for support would have to be very different and the bank should be allowed to
fail unless there is some other identifiable benefit. Only in the latter case is there some logic
in ensuring that prudent rivals do not suffer a competitive disadvantage.
While the Commission has available very considerable expertise in judging competition
issues, it does not have the specific skills to decide a suitable punishment strategy that will
discourage future moral hazard. In fact, it is not at all clear that punitive divestitures will
have any impact at all on the degree of recklessness of bankers. Better corporate governance,
unbiased bonuses and other individual incentive schemes, limited cross-subsidisation of
risky activities, suitable liability for junior and senior debt holders, sufficient capital ratios,
effective resolution schemes and generally improved prudential regulation each have a place
51 Banks complain that it has imposed conditions that have not been applied to banks receiving aid from
outside the EU. CEPS (2010) presents the views of a task force of leading European and US banks, including
two discussed in our case studies (BNP Paribas/Fortis and Lloyds/HBOS).
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in controlling moral hazard. It would be better to focus rescue and restructuring aid control
for banks exclusively on restoring balanced competition.
Finally, there may be very little time for the Commission to absorb these lessons
from the 2007–10 financial crisis. At the time of writing, there is a very substantial
probability that the Euro sovereign debt crisis will result in many more banks
requiring rescue. It is to be hoped that the Commission will pay more careful
attention to the implications for competition when it sets ‘compensatory measures’
as part of the regulation of bank restructurings.
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